

**Advanced Analytic Rigour**

**Seminar 6 – Practice Exercises**

The Hunt Laboratory for Intelligence Research

November 2020

**CONTACT**

**Ashley Barnett**

Research Associate

**Email:** [barnett.a@unimelb.edu.au](mailto:barnett.a@unimelb.edu.au)

**Tamar Primoratz**

Research Associate

**Email:** [tpri@unimelb.edu.au](mailto:tpri@unimelb.edu.au)

# Kim Do-hun

Kim Do-hun, the older brother of North Jeoson’s leader, Kim Jae-Bong, was killed in his hotel room at the Casino Babylon in Macau (World Times. Kim Do Hun Found Dead in Hotel. Aug. 20, 2018). We assess that it is highly likely (80-90%) that Kim Do-hun was killed on the orders of his brother.

It is almost certain (90-95% likely) that Kim Do-hun was killed by North Jeoson agents. Kim Do-hun was a clear nuisance to the regime and a possible threat to Jae-Bong. While not overtly political, Do-hun had contact with officials from other countries, and as the older brother the possibility remained that he may at some point make a claim on the dynasty. Furthermore, autopsy results have shown conclusively that Kim Do-hun died of PQ poisoning, and experts agree that only PQ would have resulted in Kim Do-hun’s symptoms. Recently, North Jeoson agents have used only PQ poison for killing enemies overseas. Past reports from our agency show a total of four assassinations of North Jeoson defectors and traitors in the last decade, all of whom were poisoned with PQ. These reports have been extensively verified, including by our international partner agencies. While it needs to be injected, PQ is highly effective: it’s very transportable, relatively easy to produce, and fast-acting. Only immediate medical treatment will save a victim’s life. This has made it North Jeoson agents’ weapon of choice in recent years (Global Intelligence Services. North Jeoson and Kim Do-Hun Investigation, 2019. Unclassified).

If Do-hun was killed by the North Jeoson regime, then we are extremely confident (90-95%) that it could only have been carried out at the behest of the ruler, Kim Jae-Bong. All experts agree that the younger Kim has complete control over North Jeoson and runs it with a very tight fist. No North Jeosonian official would run the risk of ordering an assassination without explicit approval from Kim Jae-Bong. High-ranking defectors from North Jeoson report that Kim Jae-Bong is easily angered by unsanctioned action on any matter of importance (Global Intelligence Services. North Jeoson and Kim Do-Hun Investigation, 2019. Unclassified).

# VX Production

We have been tasked to evaluate whether Preregistan is producing VX in its extensive new multi-purpose chemical warfare production facilities at the Bamaria chemical complex. It has previously been established that the facility is producing multiple agents. (International Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency. Bamarian MDA Production, 2016.) We have identified four key high-reliability evidence sets to inform our estimate of VX production.

One evidence set is satellite imagery of the new facilities. It shows catalytic fractionation tower designs and discharge flare patterns indicative of VX and cyclohexylsarin. Given the related nature of these compounds, we infer that either or both of VX and cyclohexylsarin are in production.

Second, an asset in the Preregistan Ministry of Industry handles supply logistics for the complex. (Office of Intelligence. Bamarian Asset Report, 2019. Classified.) He informs us that the compound Triphenoldipthanol is being delivered. Since Triphenoldipthanol is required for the production of only two agents, chloroacetophenone and VX, we infer that either or both of chloroacetophenone and VX must be in production.

Third, intercepted CCTV footage of some of the canisters exiting the new production facilities prove that the facility is producing lung toxicants, which could be chlorine and diphosgene (or both). Therefore either or both of chlorine and diphosgene are in production.

Akbi Karroubani was a senior manager at the complex. He defected six weeks ago and we have not yet

completed debriefing processes. (Office of Intelligence. Bamarian Defector Report, 2019. Classified). He is extremely intelligent and clearly has strong knowledge of the entire production schedule, but is reluctant to reveal full information in order to retain leverage in negotiations for protection of his extended family in Preregistan. The information he has provided to date has in every case been subsequently verified. Karroubani asserts that only one of inferences we made from the imagery, HUMINT, and signals intelligence sets described above is true of the production schedule.

None of the available information is inconsistent with VX production. We therefore assess that VX production at the new facilities cannot be ruled out at this time.

# Escape of agent OXLEY

## Reasoning

On Tuesday, 24 November 2020, Agent Oxley escaped from our custody at approximately 3am. We assess that Agent Oxley was highly likely aided in her escape by Ari Wasselthorpe, for the reasons set out below.

Agent Oxley is a spy on behalf of Lagasy, an enemy state. She was captured on 12 November in the capital city centre and was held at the Neffsworth Jail in a cell until Tuesday.

On Tuesday morning her cell was found unlocked and empty, and a subsequent search for her has yet to locate her whereabouts. CCTV footage of the area outside her cell shows that at 2:59am a person in a hood and face mask quickly walked over to her cell and unlocked it, and she swiftly left the cell. Unfortunately there is no further footage of her escape. The person unlocking her cell appears tall, at approximately 1.85cm, and broad-shouldered. Their precise appearance is not discernible in the footage.

There were five guards in the jail on duty at the time of the escape: Ari Wasselthorpe, Tim Zachary, Morgan Quimby, Luke Nguyen and Richard Zouch. Records indicate that of these five, four turned up for their shift and completed it, while the fifth, Richard Zouch, called in sick. Zouch did not enter the jail building sahead of Tuesday night. No one else had access to keys which would open the cell, or to the jail itself during the night. Therefore, the person who aided Agent Oxley is very likely to be one of the guards on shift.

Quimby is highly unlikely to be the person captured on the footage, as he is markedly shorter than the person on this footage. Likewise, Nguyen has a noticeable limp when walking, something which the culprit caught on the CCTV footage did not have. Finally, Zouch could not have been responsible as he was not in the building on the relevant night. Therefore, the culprit is very likely to be Wasselthorpe. Wasselthorpe fits the appearance of the person on the CCTV footage. We recommend that Wasselthorpe be apprehended for questioning and investigation into this matter.

## Background information

## Escape

* Escapee: Agent Oxley
* Wanted for the past 18 months for spying on behalf of Lagasy (an enemy state) and endangering our national security
* Apprehended 12 November 2020 in capital city centre in a supermarket
* Held at Neffsworth Jail in a solitary cell until Tuesday 24 November (her escape)
* On Tuesday morning at 7am Agent Oxley’s cell was found unlocked and empty
* An ongoing extensive search commenced that morning and has yet to locate her whereabouts; she is presumed to have left the country and returned to Lagasy
* Escaped Tuesday early morning
  + CCTV footage indicates a hooded masked person striding swiftly towards her cell at 2:59am on Tuesday 24 November
  + The person described unlocks her cell by taking out of his/her pocket a keyring with multiple keys
  + Agent Oxley quickly emerges from her cell and walks away from the frame
  + No further footage is available from the relevant wing of the building (B Wing)
  + The person is approximately 1.85cm
  + The person appears broad-shouldered
  + The person does not have any other distinguishable features in appearance or movement and is not visible in greater detail through the CCTV footage

## Persons of interest

* Five guards were on shift around 3am on Tuesday 24 November: Ari Wasselthorpe, Tim Zachary, Morgan Quimby, Luke Nguyen and Richard Zouch
* One guard – Richard Zouch – called in sick the day before and did not attend the jail on Tuesday 24 November
* No one else had access to keys that would open the cells
* No one else had access to the jail building during the night
* There is no evidence of any unusual behaviour, break-ins, or evidence of the presence of additional people in the jail on Tuesday night
* Records indicate that the four guards (those above minus Zouch) reported for duty on time and left at the conclusion of their shift on Tuesday 24 November.

## Suspects

*Ari Wasselthorpe*

* 187cm, strong and muscly in appearance
* Does weights training
* 31 years old
* Has worked at Neffsworth jail for 6 years
* Has excellent record
* Liked by colleagues
* President of the social club
* Assigned to B Wing throughout his shift on Tuesday 24 November

*Tim Zachary*

* 182cm, broad frame
* Runner
* 54 years old
* Has worked at Neffsworth jail for 8 years
* Has excellent record
* Liked by colleagues
* Assigned to A Wing throughout his shift on Tuesday 24 November
* A Wing CCTV footage shows Zachary assisting an arrestee in that wing from 2:50am to 3:14am in that arrestee’s cell

*Morgan Quimby*

* 158cm, broad frame
* 49 years old
* Has worked at Neffsworth jail for 3 years
* Has excellent record
* Liked by colleagues
* Assigned to B Wing throughout his shift on Tuesday 24 November

*Luke Nguyen*

* 180cm, broad and muscly in appearance
* Following an accident some years ago, walks with strong limp
* 34 years old
* Has worked at Neffsworth jail for 4 years
* Has excellent record
* Liked by most colleagues, victim of regular racist slurs by a small minority of colleagues
* Assigned to B Wing throughout his shift on Tuesday 24 November

*Richard Zouch*

* 178cm, muscly in appearance
* Cyclist
* 39 years old
* Has worked at Neffsworth jail for 3 years
* Has excellent record
* Liked by colleagues
* Called in sick on Monday 23 November
* Did not enter the jail building on Monday 23 November or Tuesday 24 November
* Not assigned to any Wings in the jail on Tuesday 24 November due to taking sick leave

# SIMON SMITH

## Reasoning

We have begun preliminary investigations into Simon Smith because of extremist comments he has been posting online. In our assessment, Simon Smith is likely a member of the dangerous extremist group ZAK. A key indicator is belonging to extremist groups on social media. We conducted a preliminary investigation to determine whether he belongs to extremist groups and found that Smith has joined the Brain Fight (BF) group on Facebook, an extremist group which has thousands of members dedicated to discussing highly unusual conspiracy theories and extremist views. 90% of ZAK members we have investigated are members of the BF Facebook group, while of those who following investigation are found not to be members of ZAK, only 30% belong to the BF group. Therefore, it is likely that Smith is a member of ZAK.

## Background information

This year we have investigated 10,000 potential extremists, i.e. individuals we have identified who have made extremist comments online and exhibited other similar behaviour.

One popular group we have identified in our investigations is ZAK, where we have had 1,000 confirmed cases from our investigations.

We have also looked into online social media groups and identified “Brain Fight” (BF) as a group of interest. There is additional information about these below

**ZAK**

* Total number of members: unknown
* Of members identified in our investigations above, 90% belong to BF
* Members espouse extremist ideology and views and have been responsible for over 5 terrorist attacks in the past two years
  + These attacks were resulted in the deaths of a total of 12 people, all innocent of any wrongdoing
  + In addition, 17 people, all bystanders, were injured in these attacks

**Brain Fight group**

* Facebook group
* Total number of members as of 20 November 2020: 12,400
* Active since January 2011
* Includes a variety of posts
* Posts regularly include espousal of conspiracy theories and support for extremist ideologies and views

# LFG planning Attack on Abaddon Military Base

Assessment: It is highly probable (80-95%) that the LFG insurgency group is planning to attack the Abaddon Military Base.

The LFG are clearly planning an attack in the Quazar region in the near future. Our agents on the ground report a clear influx of men of fighting age into the LFG stronghold city of Puktragar. (Special Operations Brigade. Tactical Intelligence Report #547OP, 2019. Classified.) Furthermore, imagery from surveillance drones also shows approximately 40% more people at a nearby training camp. At this time of year there is no other explanation for this build-up, and our agents don’t report any event or activity that would explain it.

Furthermore, our surveillance of the digital communication of the Dreger criminal organisation confirms that the gang has been selling weapons, including RPGs and grenades, to the LFG. Recently intercepted ZeeChat communication between the groups shows that the LFG is purchasing drastically more munitions than they have previously. This arrangement with the Dreger gang has also been verified with our informant within the gang, and to date his information has generally proved to be correct. (Signals Intelligence Bureau. Dreger Gang Intercepts. Classified 2019; Special Operations Brigade. Informant 254 Report, 2019. Classified.)

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, our assets in the regional villages and towns report that the LFG contacts are increasing active intel collection, collecting intel on our military bases in the area and on our recent operations, and reinforcing their connections with the local people.

Thus, our assessment is that it is highly likely (90-95%) that the LFG is planning an attack in the Quazar region.

As for the actual target, there are 3 military bases in the Quazar region: Abaddon, Orlando, and Damour. There are no other targets of strategic importance. Abaddon and Orlando are the closest bases to the LFG city of Puktrager, and as such are the most heavily fortified, but also the most strategically important. Furthermore, a recently recruited informant (Special Operations Brigade. Informant 213 Report, 2019. Classified.) claims that Damour is not a top priority for the LFG, so it appears that their current strategic planning is not to attack Damour anytime soon. The open terrain surrounding Orlando would make any assault extremely costly. Additionally, attacking Orlando would require crossing territory held by the warlord Brion Ruikzer, who regards the LFG with great suspicion, and there have been minor firefights between LFG scouting parties and Ruikzer’s men. Even with the influx of men, it is hard to imagine that the LFG would have the strength to mount more than one major attack, and so far the LFG has proved to be a very cautious adversary (Special Operations Brigade. Tactical Assessment 45A - Orlando, 2019. Classified.). Given these considerations, we therefore believe that if an attack is carried out, it is close to certain (90-95%) that Abaddon will be the target.

Thus, our primary finding is that it is highly probable (80-95%) that the LFG insurgency group is planning to attack the Abaddon Military Base.

As an aside, while we lack the information required to determine when the LFG will be able to carry out their plan, or if anything is likely to interfere with it, recent analysis suggests that it is extremely unlikely that the LFG will abandon any planned attack because it is abundantly clear that a quick victory is required to boost the morale of their supporters and revive their PR campaign to attract more support. (LFG Strategic Assessment, #6757, 2019, Classified).

# Recommendation to Deny Passport for Dylan Weinholt

From: Director, Antipodean Security Organisation  
To: Minister for Foreign Affairs, Antipodes  
Subject: Recommendation to Deny Passport for Dylan Wienholt

The applicable legislation cites that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has the power to cancel or to deny a passport based on a recommendation form a Competent Authority. The ASO is a Competent Authority. A Competent Authority can reccomend cancellation or to deny if it suspects and has reasonable grounds that a person would be likely to engage in conduct contrary to security, or might infringe Antipodean law when a person is overseas.

The ASO recommends that the Minister deny Dylan Weinholt’s application for a passport, on the grounds diseminated below.

The ASO suspects Dylan John Weinholt, DOB 12/4/98, likely to engage conduct contrary to security outside the Antipodes. The ASO has been undertaking monitoring on Weinholt for 10 months. (Antipodean Security Office. Investigation #5687CT- subject: Weinholt. Classified.)

1. Weinholt has become radicalised in the International Cryptocurrency Union, a group intent to replace all major currencies around the world with distributed cryptocurrency - their own currency Randanium. They conceive of this as a crucial step toward a worldwide Anarcho-Libertarianism where all forms of Government have been terminated. Their strategy for terminating major currencies is to use cyber-warfare - hacking- to disrupt he software systems maintaining of existing currencies. The ASO has currently two undercover assets in the union, and monitors communications of union members.

* + - Weinholt is an active member of the Antipodean branch of the International Cryptocurrency Union, and he attends weekly gatherings and is participating in their forum on the Dark Web
    - Rules of the International Cryptocurrency Union require the members to have a signed agreement to the union objectives with a number members as witnesses. (Antipodean Security Office. Investigation #5687CT- subject Weinholt. Classified.)

2. Weinholt intends to travel overseas to coordinate a cyber warfare assault on all the major currencies.

* + - Our assets in the union have reported to us the the leaders of the branch have agreed that to evade the possible occurrence of eavesdropping by security services, critical planning for global cyber strike on major currencies needs to be conducted in “face-to-face” meetings. Weinholt has been given this role, this is because, as a relatively new member and somebody who has not travelled to other countries, he has the most capacity to fly “under the radar.” (Antipodean Security Office. Investigation #5687CT- subject Weinholt. Classified.)

3. Wienholt has been arranging to meet with people in the US, Ukraine, Montenegro. (Antipodean Security Office. Investigation #5687CT- subject Weinholt. Classified.) We have extensive knowledge of Weinholt’s background and we can find no plausible explanation for this travel plan except pursuing the agenda stipulated above.



THE HUNT LABORATORY FOR INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

**CONTACT**

**Ashley Barnett Tamar Primoratz**

Research Associate Research Associate

**Email:** [barnett.a@unimelb.edu.au](mailto:barnett.a@unimelb.edu.au) **Email:** [tpri@unimelb.edu.au](mailto:tpri@unimelb.edu.au)